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Abstract 
 
In 1812 impressment was left as the implied cause for the outbreak of war between Britain 
and the United States of America. Scholars have focused on how impressment was involved 
in diplomacy. There remains, however, a lack of investigation into the justification of 
impressment. This dissertation explores the impressment of Americans by the Royal Navy 
and the resulting fallout. The research will focus on one group in particular: naturalised 
American citizens. The aim is to show that the conflict over impressment stemmed from 
Britain and America possessing different conceptualisations of citizenship and rights. The 
dissertation examines the history of impressment in Britain and the doctrine of indefeasible 
allegiance together with American arguments against the doctrine. This research is based on 
the correspondence of politicians, treatises, laws and secondary scholarship. Using these 
sources a narrative of diplomacy and rights will be constructed. Upon the examination of the 
evidence it becomes clear that American claims about the unjustness of the impressment of 
naturalised American citizens are wrong. While there was a dispute if naturalisation could 
occur, the fact is that the American government loudly disputed the British right to reclaim a 
large number of naturalised sailors when by the laws of America these sailors were not 
naturalised.  
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Introduction 
 
American scholars often introduce the War of 1812 as the second war for American 
independence. This moniker is accurate from an American perspective reflecting the general 
sentiment of many Americans in 1812. Americans viewed Britain with anger and contempt 
for its restrictive policies. Historians have in great detail examined the causes of the outbreak 
of war between the two nations in 1812. Out of this examination the first explanation 
emerged for the outbreak of war: that of impressment; American seamen forcibly taken from 
their ships to serve in the Royal Navy. Historians of this school maintain that the 
impressment of American sailors challenged the sovereignty of America to the point where 
James Madison had little choice but to declare war. Firstly, for the injury suffered to national 
pride. Secondly, to display that citizens and ships travelling under the American flag were 
indeed protected. Thirdly, that America’s sovereignty was worth something.1 Later historians 
assert that congressmen and senators newly elected from western and southern states pushed 
through the declaration of war. These representatives had ulterior motives such as the 
promise of carving out new American territories in Canada and to halt British sponsored 
Indian raids. Despite this new interpretation, these historians conceded that the anger over 
impressment played a part in outbreak of hostilities.2  
 
Notably absent from past studies are British perspectives. The lack of British interest in the 
subject is a reflection on British attitudes found during the period. The British saw the War of 
1812 as insignificant given the greater struggle in Europe. Another notable lack of enquiry 
regards the legality and right of impressment and the role of citizenship in impressment.  
Previous studies on the impressment of American sailors pay only lip service to the right of 
the British to search and remove their own citizens but no focused study has been forth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   Harry	   L.	   Coles,	   The	   War	   of	   1812	   (Chicago,	   IL:	   University	   of	   Chicago	   Press,	   1965).;	   James	   Zimmermann,	  
Impressment	  of	  American	  Seamen	  (Port	  Washington,	  NY:	  Kennikat	  Press,	  	  1966).	  
2	  Reginald	  Horsman,	  The	  Causes	  of	  the	  War	  of	  1812	  (Philadelphia,	  PA:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  1961).;	  
Roger	   H.	   Brown,	   The	   Republic	   in	   Peril	   (New	   York,	   NY:	   Columbia	   University	   Press,	   1964).;	   Bradford	   Perkins,	  
Prologue	   to	   War:	   England	   and	   the	   United	   States,	   1805-­‐1812	   (Berkeley,	   CA:	   University	   of	   California	   Press,	  
1961).;	  J.C.A	  Stagg,	  Mr	  Madison’s	  War	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1983).	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coming.3 This research attempts to rectify this gap in scholarship by examining and directly 
contrasting the opinions of both Britain and America through legalisation, articles and in 
particular two treatises on the issue. This research will contain four chapters. The first chapter 
establishes the history of impressment in Britain with special reference to the legality of the 
practice. The second chapter deals with British opinion regarding impressment on the high 
seas. Chapter three will discuss American diplomacy and naturalisation. Chapter four will 
explore impressment in the negotiations at Ghent. 
 
A number of works exist both about impressment and the causes of the War of 1812. 
Zimmermann’s Impressment of American Seamen is the most extensive exploration of the 
subject. Denver Brunsman’s thesis The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the 
Eighteenth Century Atlantic World, J.R. Hutchinson’s The Press Gang: Afloat and Ashore 
and Nicholas Rogers’ The Press Gang: Naval Impressment and its opponents in Georgian 
Britain are valuable sources for the history of impressment along with N.A.M Rodger’s 
general work on the Royal Navy, The Command of the Ocean. The diplomacy of America is 
found in J.C.A Stagg’s Mr Madison War’s, Bradford Perkins’ Prologue to War and C.T. 
White’s A Nation on Trial: American and the War of 1812	  amongst other works. Primary 
sources are generally biased given the nature of the debates. Legal cases from Britain 
naturally look to defend impressment. Debates are also contained within The American State 
Papers and the diaries and correspondence of politicians. 
 
At the heart of the debate regarding the right to impress naturalised American citizens are two 
treatises. American attitudes and legal opinion are encapsulated in A Treatise on Expatriation 
by George Hay written in 1814.4 Hay was the U.S. attorney for the District of Virginia at the 
time and was married to Eliza Kortright Monroe, the daughter of James Monroe. Expatriation 
may not suggest a link to impressment but Hay immediately writes  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   Horsman,	   The	   Causes	   of	   the	  War	   of	   1812,	   pp.26-­‐28.;	   Perkins,	   Prologue	   to	  War,	   pp.83-­‐94.;	   Scott	   Thomas	  
Jackson,	  ‘Impressment	  and	  Anglo-­‐American	  Discord,	  1787-­‐1818’,	  (Ph.D.	  thesis,	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  1976),	  
72-­‐75.;	  Denver	  Brunsman,	   ‘The	   Evil	  Necessity:	   British	  Naval	   Impressment	   in	   the	   Eighteenth	  Century	  Atlantic	  
World’	  (Ph.D.	  thesis,	  Princeton	  University,	  2004).	  	  These	  works	  briefly	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  regarding	  the	  
extent	  American	  government	  was	  willing	  to	  allow	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  to	  reclaim	  deserters	  and	  British	  sailors.	  	  	  	  	  
4	  George	  Hay,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Expatriation	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  A.	  &	  G.	  Way,	  1814).	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I am well aware of the difficulties which attend this undertaking; but I am impelled to engage in it, by 
the hope that I may not only contribute towards the vindication of the opposition made by the United 
States to the British claim of impressment, but afford some aid to the great cause of freedom and 
humanity.5 
 
Using the idea of expatriation Hay contends that Britain is unjustified in her practice of 
impressing naturalised American seamen. Britain, according to America, had no right to 
impress naturalised citizens because an individual could renounce his allegiance to a 
sovereign. The Right and Practice of Impressment, as Concerning Great Britain and America 
Considered appeared in London in 1814 after the publication of Hay’s treatise.6 The author of 
the pamphlet is unknown. The author is most likely a lawyer or a judge. The treatise may 
have been written as a favour to a Member of Parliament or by commission. There is also a 
possibility that the treatise was written to counter to Hay’s treatise. The British treatise is not 
a point for point counter but at one point mentions A Treatise on Expatriation and directly 
refutes one of Hay’s arguments.7 The treatise states the case for Britain’s right to impress as 
well as revealing British attitudes to American arguments against about the practice. The 
British argument is found on the belief that a British citizen could never renounce his 
allegiance to his sovereign. Impressment was a mainstay in American diplomacy from 1803-
7 before receding into the background. Impressment returned to the fore when it was left as 
the visible reason for the outbreak of war. The lack of an agreement on impressment in the 
Treaty of Ghent subsequently remains puzzling.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Hay,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Expatriation,	  p.1.	  
6	  Anonymous,	  The	  Right	  and	  Practice	  of	  Impressment,	  as	  Concerning	  Great	  Britain	  and	  America	  Considered	  
(London,	  1814).	  	  
7	  Ibid.,	  pp.12-­‐14.	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A History of British Impressment 
 
Impressment supposedly dates back to the period of Saxon Kings in English history.8 The 
practice seemingly gained prominence under King John (1166 –1216) whose reign was 
marked by numerous wars requiring a steady stream of men for the navy. The practice was 
deeply ingrained in the feudal system where few questioned the right of the sovereign to levy 
armed forces; consequently there was little need for coercion. Despite John’s signing of 
Magna Carta, a document that supposedly guaranteed the liberties of all Englishmen, King 
John continued to press men. There is evidence that Henry VIII used impressment in the face 
of a possible French invasion in 1545. The conclusion from this evidence is that it was the 
Crown’s prerogative to press men into service and that this prerogative was generally 
accepted by English society.9 The first piece of concrete legalisation regarding impressment 
was The Vagrancy Act (1597) which made it legal for vagrants to be pressed into service.10 
 
Impressment was greatly expanded with the help of Samuel Pepys, a noted diarist who served 
as Clerk of Acts (1660-73) and Admiralty Secretary twice (1673-79, 1684-89). This 
expansion was in response to the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars.11 Noticeably in 
Pepys’ diary he himself wrote about impressment in a very different light to his public 
persona, ‘To the Tower several times, about the business of the pressed men [....] to see poor 
patient labouring men and housekeepers leaving poor wives and families, taken up on a 
sudden by strangers, was very hard, and that without press-money [...] It is a great tyranny.’12 
What is interesting about Pepys (and a recurring theme in impressment) is that Pepys 
distained the practice despite bearing responsibility for the expansion and continuation of it. 
Captain Edward Brenton who served during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  J.R	  Hutchinson,	  The	  Press	  Gang:	  Afloat	  and	  Ashore	  (London:	  Eveleigh	  Nash,	  1913),	  p.4.;	  Brunsman,	  ‘The	  Evil	  
Necessity’,	  22.	  
9	  Hutchinson,	  The	  Press	  Gang:	  Afloat	  and	  Ashore,	  pp.5-­‐7.	  
10	  Royal	  Navy	  Museum,	  ‘Impressment:	  The	  Press	  Gang	  and	  Naval	  Recruitment’,	  
http://www.royalnavalmuseum.org/info_sheet_impressment.html	  .	  	  
11	  Denver	  Brunsman,	  ‘Men	  of	  War:	  British	  Sailors	  and	  the	  Impressment	  Paradox’,	  Journal	  of	  Early	  Modern	  
History,	  14	  (2010),	  29.	  	  
12	  Samuel	  Pepys,	  ‘1	  July	  1666’,	  The	  Diary	  of	  Samuel	  Pepys	  from	  1659	  to	  1669	  ed.	  Lord	  Braybrooke	  (London:	  
Fredrick	  Warne	  and	  Co.,	  1879),	  http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3331/pg3331.html	  .	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said of impressment ‘It is impossible to describe the terror, the anxiety, the cruelty, the 
injustice and the grievous wrongs inflicted on society in general, by the continuance of this 
practice.’13 This gives insight into the place of impressment with the British national psyche; 
that impressment was a cruel but necessary practice based on the government’s right under 
the sovereign to forcibly levy men. This idea emerged during the Cromwellian era when 
standing armies were associated with tyrannical governments while navies protected freedom 
and liberty. In the early eighteen century both British statesman and scholars began to evolve 
this idea promoting the naval based British empire as an ‘empire of liberty’ compared to the 
vast land empires of the Spanish and Holy Roman Empires making the Royal Navy a 
centrepiece of British identity.14  
 
Although accepted as a sovereign’s right laws came into effect to regulate and give 
legitimacy to impressment. During the reign of Queen Anne The Recruiting Act (1703) was 
passed regulating impressment. The Act forbade the impressment of boys under the age of 
eighteen, those who were apprenticed in a trade while expanding the navy by impressing 
vagrants and those of no visible means.15 An Act in 1706 allowed for debtors owing less than 
£20 to be released from jail if they served in the navy. Another Act was also passed in 1740 
that stopped the impressment of men over the age of fifty-five.16 The most notable legal 
collection of material regarding impressment is from Alexander Broadfoot’s case of 1743. In 
this case Alexander Broadfoot, a merchant sailor, was charged with murder after a gang tried 
to press him. In his attempt to resist the gang he produced a blunderbuss, fired and 
subsequently killed an unarmed gangsman. The verdict was eventually manslaughter with the 
judge, Sir Michael Foster, deeming the gang acted illegally due to the fact that the lieutenant 
who held the press warrant was not present at the time. Foster brought forth a number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Edward	  Brenton,	  Life	  and	  Correspondence	  of	  John,	  Earl	  of	  St.	  Vincent.	  Vol.2	  (London:	  Henry	  Colburn,	  1838),	  
p.82	  quoted	  in	  N.A.M	  Rodger,	  The	  Command	  of	  the	  Ocean	  (London:	  W.W	  Norton	  and	  Company	  Ltd.,	  2004),	  
p.500.	  	  	  
14	  David	  Armitage,	  The	  Ideological	  Origins	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  
chp.	  4-­‐5.;	  Brunsman,	  ‘The	  Evil	  Necessity’,	  50-­‐	  54.	  
15	  Christopher	  Lloyd,	  The	  British	  Seaman	  1200-­‐1860:	  A	  Social	  Survey	  (London:	  Collins,	  1968),	  	  p.125.;	  Sir	  
Michael	  Foster,	  A	  Report	  of	  Some	  Proceedings	  on	  the	  Commission	  of	  Oyer	  and	  Terminer	  and	  Gaol	  Delivery	  for	  
the	  Trial	  of	  the	  Rebels	  in	  the	  Year	  1746	  in	  the	  Country	  of	  Surry,	  and	  of	  Other	  Crown	  Cases	  .	  ..	  	  3rd.	  edn,	  (London:	  
E.	  and	  R.	  Brooke,	  1792),	  p.	  172.	  
16	  Foster,	  A	  Report	  of	  Some	  Proceedings...,	  p.174.	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arguments for the legality of impressment. Foster argued that the right of naval impressment 
trumped private rights in cases of national security and that impressment was ‘a prerogative 
inherent in the Crown, grounded upon common law and recognised by many acts of 
Parliament’.17 Foster went so far as to acknowledge that this service unfortunately fell almost 
exclusively to one occupational class but still asserted that impressment was not illegal. 
Foster’s judgement was reinforced in 1776 with Rex vs. Tubbs decision. When deciding the 
legality of a particular incident of impressment the King’s Bench agreed with Foster that 
impressment was a vestigial prerogative power, based on ‘immemorial usage.’18  
 
What can be said about the history or the relationship between the British and impressment? 
Impressment had been present in British memory dating to before the Norman Conquest. 
Impressment was conducive with the feudal concept of levying men to serve the king. The 
practice continued based on the sovereign’s prerogative and eventually in the late sixteenth 
century parliament began to legislate the practice. Legal cases dealing with those resisting 
impressment, cited these Acts of Parliament as precedence for the legality of impressment. 
The British attempted to move impressment from the sphere of divine law to the spheres of 
common and civil law. The justification of impressment, however, remained with a citizen’s 
obligation to the Crown. Individuals did not take this lying down with numerous cases of men 
attempting to free themselves from impressment by challenging the law sometimes using the 
writ of Habeas Corpus and opposition could be as violent as Atlantic-wide riots.19 On the eve 
of the French Revolutionary Wars impressment was an accepted albeit ugly practice within 
British society. This sentiment was to be reinforced by the incessant need for men in the 
coming twenty-three years of war. In 1792 British naval manpower stood at 17,361, by 1812 
it had exploded to 144,844.20 Regardless of any opposition (even from its own officers) the 
Admiralty continued with its time honoured tradition in the face of numerous conflicts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Foster,	  A	  Report	  of	  Some	  Proceedings...,	  p.159.	  
18	  Nicholas	  Rogers,	  The	  Press	  Gang:	  Naval	  Impressment	  and	  its	  opponents	  in	  Georgian	  Britain	  (London:	  
Continuum,	  2007),	  p.20.	  
19	  Kevin	  Costello,	  ‘Habeas	  Corpus	  and	  Military	  and	  Naval	  Impressment,	  1756–1816’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  
History,	  29	  (2)	  (2008),	  215-­‐251.;	  Denver	  Brunsman,	  ‘The	  Knowles	  Atlantic	  Impressment	  Riots	  of	  the	  1740s.’	  
Early	  American	  Studies:	  An	  Interdisciplinary	  Journal,	  5	  (2)	  (2007),	  324-­‐366.	  
	  
20	  N.A.M	  Rodger,	  The	  Command	  of	  the	  Ocean,	  p.639.	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keeping with the British idea that being an island nation the navy was the protector of her and 
her  ‘empire of liberty’. 
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The British and Indefeasible Allegiance 
 
As the empire grew the British extended impressment to the colonies. This move had both 
principled and practice considerations. Practically the Royal Navy needed to man their ships 
to protect British territorial holdings and ensure the safety of its merchant fleet. In the age of 
sail crossing the Atlantic to America or the West Indies took months not weeks. It was 
impossible for warships to return to England to press men. Royal Navy commanders merely 
impressed men in colonial ports or on the high seas. Merchant captains employed men in 
England and traded in colonies so navy captains took the opportunity to bring their crews to 
full compliment. This was considered legal as the colonies were an extension of Britain. All 
rights of the sovereign could be exercised in the colonies. The loss of America meant that 
Britain had lost a large component of its economic system and reserves of manpower. The 
problem for Britain was only compounded by new competition on the international stage. 
America had an abundance of land and a steady stream of new immigrants that could make it 
a rival to Britain in trade. This fear would be proven to be correct in the long term and the 
rise in American commerce would adversely affect the supply of British seamen. 
 
Another fear was that with an independent America British sailors would be attracted to 
American ships. Life in the Royal Navy was harsh. The conditions were cramped, 
unhygienic, damp and dangerous. Combat meant the possibility of death or imprisonment 
while being blown off course or incompetent navigation could end in the same way. 21 
Discipline was brutal. Lashing was the main punishment; sailors often received twelve lashes 
for drunkenness. On one day a naval court heard three cases handing out a total of a thousand 
lashes in punishment. Thieves were given between two hundred to five hundred lashes.22 This 
harsh treatment meant that once America gained independence many men of the Royal Navy 
deserted in American ports or in British ports by signing up to American merchantmen. The 
problem was not only confined to the Navy but also the British merchant fleet where wages 
were significantly lower than their American counterparts. Desertion was so widespread that 
it was claimed by the Admiralty that some 20,000 British sailors were serving aboard 
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  Rodger,	  The	  Wooden	  World:	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  Navy	  (London:	  Fontana	  Press,	  1988),	  pp.46-­‐
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American ships by 1812.23 In one farcical episode HMS Phaeton while carrying Anthony 
Merry, the new British ambassador to America, had fourteen men desert while in port at 
Norfolk, Virginia.24   Britain was faced with the increasing dilemma of losing seaman during 
a period where they essential to the war effort against France.  
 
Attempting to regain lost sailors the British began to halt American merchant ships to search 
for deserters.  The right to search American merchant vessels on the high seas was not 
explicitly denied by American government. James Madison, who was the staunchest 
opponent of impressment, conceded that the British held this right if the correct process was 
adhered to.25 It was considered the right of a belligerent of war (in this case Great Britain) to 
stop neutral ships (America) that were suspected of trading with the enemy (France) and 
search their hold for contraband goods and agents of the enemy.26 Furthermore the American 
government allowed the impressment of British seamen from its ships in British ports i.e. 
within British territory.27 The high seas, however, were an issue for debate. The British 
maintained that since the legal right to search and remove contraband was not denied by the 
Americans it was legal for British to remove their citizens as an extension of contraband. The 
author28 of the pamphlet The Right and Practice of Impressment as Concerning Great Britain 
and America considered wrote: 
 
if the right of search for contraband of war is not denied, why should the right of search for man,--man, 
which is, in truth, the highest species of contraband of war, because all other kinds are merely materials 
for his use, and useful to a belligerent in direct proportion to the number of men which it may have to 
employ on those materials?29 
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  Perkins,	  Prologue	  to	  War,	  p.90.	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  Horsman,	  The	  Causes	  of	  the	  War	  of	  1812,	  p.26.	  
25	  Perkins,	  Prologue	  to	  War,	  p.89.	  
26	   Anonymous,	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   Right	   and	   Practice	   of	   Impressment...,	   p.15;	   Jackson,	   ‘Impressment	   and	   Anglo-­‐American	  
Discord,	  1787-­‐1818’,	  88.;	  Zimmerman,	  The	  Impressment	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  American	  Seamen,	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  Patrick	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  White,	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  Nation	  on	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  and	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  1812	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1965),	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  Perkins,	  Prologue	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28	  The	  author	  of	  this	  treatise	  is	  unknown.	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  this	  point	  onwards	  The	  Right	  and	  Practice	  of	  Impressment...	  will	  
be	  referred	  to	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  ‘the	  British	  treatise.’	  	  	  	  
29	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  Right	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  Practice	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  Impressment...,	  p.16.	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The British claimed that their escaped sailors were effectively contraband because they were 
materials of war and were evading their duty. An article in The Edinburgh Review enforced 
this view maintaining that ‘the right of impressment which is invested in the sovereign [...] 
which entitles him to annul and disregard all contracts entered into our own merchants with 
persons using the sea, entitles him just as clearly to disregard any similar engagement into 
which such persons may have entered into with foreign merchants.’30 These two passages 
reflect the position of Britain. Firstly, the sovereign had the absolute right to levy men to 
serve his armed forces. This right trumped not only any employment contract between two 
British citizens but also any contracts that involved one only British citizen. Secondly, any 
citizen trying to avoid the right of the sovereign was considered to be aiding the enemy. This 
classification placed deserters in the same category as guns, swords, saltpetre and foodstuffs, 
which could be removed from any neutral ships on the high seas.  Despite the unpopularity of 
the searches various American newspapers agreed that Britain had the right of search and 
seizure.31 The seizure of contraband was separate legal issue. The British searched vessels 
upon the high seas and removed suspected contraband, sometimes seizing entire ships if they 
were suspected of smuggling. This practice was a common occurrence during the Napoleonic 
Wars in an attempt to stop the French from equipping their armed forces through neutral 
trade. The seizure of contraband was regulated by the Admiralty courts as the revenue 
generated for the selling of these goods constituted prize money for the seizing crew. Officers 
could not touch this prize money until the goods or the ships were brought into a British port 
and an Admiralty court deemed the seizure legal.32  
 
The owners and captains of ships were able to redress any cargo seizures through the 
Admiralty courts. This begs the question, if the British afforded this right of redress to cargo 
was it extended to individuals? The British treatise argues that this right is afforded to the 
sailor and the method in which Britain operates reduces the damage to American interests. 
Two options could occur when suspected British sailors are found on American merchant 
ships. Firstly, ‘to detain the ship, and send her into a British port, with a view of instituting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  The	  Edinburgh	  Review	  or	  Critical	  Review	  Nov.1814…	  Feb.1815	  (Edinburgh:	  Archibald	  Constable	  and	  
Company,	  1815),	  p.248.	  
31	  Zimmermann,	  Impressment	  of	  American	  Seamen,	  p.173.	  
32	  Alfred	  Burt,	  ‘The	  Nature	  of	  Maritime	  Issues’	  in	  The	  Causes	  of	  the	  War	  of	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  National	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Interest?	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legal proceedings on the subject;’33 Secondly, ‘to take the suspected individual out of the 
neutral ship, permitting her to continue her voyage, and reserving the case of the seaman for 
further inquiry, if he or the neutral state shall choose to dispute the fact of his being a British 
subject.’34 It is ‘obvious that the latter course is that most favourable to the neutral 
interests.’35 The British were ‘justified’ in taking this course of action given the noted 
opposition by Americans. Americans claimed the searches and impressment caused undue 
injury to Americans.36 The British response was that the sailor would be given the 
opportunity to dispute the contention that he was a British subject. In this manner like 
material contraband the sailor must be found to be legally seized or else he was returned to 
his country of origin.  
 
The issue of allegiance brought about an interesting legal clash about citizenship. The legal 
basis for impressment derived from the sovereign and that this was expanded to all citizens of 
the empire. Independent America, however, confused this issue. Immigration to America 
usually signified that immigrants would remain in America for life. Immigrants would stand 
to be either dual-citizens or American citizens who had renounced their British citizenship. 
British legal opinion stated neither of these instances could occur. The British treatise 
identified the American challenge to British impressment as ‘On an assertion of the right of a 
natural born subject of one state to adopt, and naturalize himself in, another; and to transfer 
his allegiance to the latter, to the exclusion of the former.’37 The response, citing Emerich de 
Vattel, maintained that ‘Each individual is bound to contribute his personal means to the 
common strength of the society or nation’, a loss of citizens fundamentally weakened the 
state.38 A state looks to preserve itself and by extension ‘as a means of self preservation, all 
its members.’ 39 A state could not lose citizens lest it weaken itself. This principle is referred 
to as indefeasible allegiance, an established concept in Europe at the time. Indefeasible 
allegiance quite simply was the doctrine that a person was forever bound to the country of 
their birth and that they could not renounce their citizenship. Legal opinion enforced this in 
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  Anonymous,	  The	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  and	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  p.20.	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  Ibid.	  
35	  Ibid.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  p.20-­‐21.	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  Ibid.,	  p.4.	  
38	  Ibid.	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Britain. Noted jurist Sir William Blackstone had written a chapter on the rights of individuals 
and allegiance. Blackstone states that 
 
Natural	  allegiance	  is	  such	  as	  is	  due	  from	  all	  men	  born	  within	  the	  king's	  dominions	  immediately	  upon	  
heir	  birth...	  Natural	  allegiance	  is	  therefore	  a	  debt	  of	  gratitude;	  which	  cannot	  be	  forfeited,	  cancelled,	  
or	  altered,	  by	  any	  change	  of	  time,	  place,	  or	  circumstance	  [...]	  LOCAL	  allegiance	  is	  such	  as	  is	  due	  from	  
an	   alien,	   or	   stranger	   born,	   for	   so	   long	   time	   as	   he	   continues	   within	   the	   king's	   dominion	   and	  
protection...	   Natural	   allegiance	   is	   therefore	   perpetual	   [...]	   therefore	   the	   prince	   is	   always	   under	   a	  
constant	  tie	  to	  protect	  his	  natural-­‐born	  subjects,	  at	  all	  times	  and	  in	  all	  countries,	  for	  this	  reasons	  their	  
allegiance	  due	  to	  him	  is	  equally	  universal	  and	  permanent.40	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
The British had two different categories of allegiance. Natural allegiance which could never 
be removed. The sovereign was forever bound to protect his subjects and his subjects had to 
reciprocate this allegiance. Natural allegiance meant that also no British citizen could 
repudiate his citizenship. Local allegiance was the situation in which a foreign citizen was 
protected by the sovereign for the duration of residency. Sir John Nicholl, the King’s 
Advocate-General, was also of the opinion that British subjects would remain so for the rest 
of their lives when asked for his judgement during the Monroe-Pinkney negotiations of 
1806.41 Nicholl in his decision maintained that expatriation was a right held by the state 
alone. Reinforcing Blackstone’s judgement Nicholl concluded that impressment superseded 
any contract the sailor had with a company or other state.42 Nicholl went even further than 
Blackstone and concluded that there were no boundaries when a nation was enforcing a 
subject’s duty to the crown, subsequently the searching of American ships was legal.43   
 
The British regarded citizenship as something not to be thrown off at will. If this were to 
occur then, ‘the greatest crime known to the law of all countries, namely, HIGH TREASON, 
would be become a safe and profitable practice.’44 ‘Individual’ is an important concept in 
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  Weight	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  Bickham,	  The	  Weight	  of	  Vengeance...,	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  and	  Practice	  of	  Impressment...,	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understanding the British meaning of citizenship. A collective of individuals who share a 
common language, culture and social structure and who live in a defined territory are referred 
to as a nation.45 The state is a legal and political body that rules the nation.46 The individual 
enters into a social contract with the head of state (the sovereign) for protection while in 
return the citizens agree to pledge fealty which implicitly consists of right and duties. The 
British as previously explained viewed this contract as unbreakable by the subject. The 
sovereign held the power to break this bond by such means as a bill of attainder. The 
individual could not break this bond because his repudiation of his citizenship was not his 
right as he could harm the state. Furthering this idea was British treatise regarding the 
position of foreign volunteers in the Royal Navy 
 
[there are] two distinct characters in every foreign seaman: -the one individual and personal, the other 
national. In the former character, any seaman may voluntarily enter the British service; and having 
thus, of his own accord, entered into an individual engagement, he is not permitted again to change his 
mind, and depart from that engagement. He voluntarily relinquishes his individual rights as a foreign 
citizen, and is not allowed, at his pleasure, to resume them. But the national character is not an 
individual, but a public right: it belongs less to the seaman himself than to the sovereign who has a 
claim to his service; and it is therefore admitted that even the voluntary entry of a foreigner into our 
navy cannot bar the right of his sovereign to reclaim him.47 
 
To the British the right of citizenship lay with the sovereign; he alone could give it or take it 
away. A citizen could forfeit the individual rights that were inherently his but his national 
rights belonged to the sovereign. The sovereign was bound by duty to ensure no harm came 
to the state. The sovereign could not allow the individual to forfeit his citizenship because the 
loss a citizen harmed the state.  
  
In summary, impressment to British came down to two things.  The first was the right in a 
period of war to search American merchant vessels for contraband. The second was the 
doctrine of indefensible allegiance. In Chapter One the basis of impressment was established 
and the British continued in this vein all over the empire. The right to stop and search neutral 
ships for contraband during wartime was a legal and a widely accepted practice during the 
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period. The British believed that the reclaiming of their seamen was correct as these men by 
definition were contraband. Men who attempted to escape their duties as subjects were aiding 
France. These subjects were subverting their duty by hiding amongst Americans or trying to 
obtain American citizenship. The British refused to accept this change of citizenship; a man 
could try and become an American citizen but if he was born British he was forever a subject 
of his sovereign. As a subject he owed his allegiance forever to the British Crown, so when 
found aboard American ships his undying allegiance could force him into the Royal Navy. 
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America and Citizenship 
 
British impressment had never been welcome in the Thirteen Colonies. In 1747 a Captain 
Knowles had sparked a three-day riot in Boston when attempting to press men. The riot was 
large enough to be considered the worst anti-British violence in the colonies only to be 
surpassed in 1765 by the Stamp Act riots.48 The Colonists felt so aggrieved about 
impressment that it was one of their complaints against George III in the Declaration of 
Independence, ‘He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear 
Arms against their Country.’49 The first incidents of the impressment of American citizens 
occurred in 1787 during a dispute between Britain and France over revolutions in the 
Netherlands and again when Britain clashed with Spain in 1790.50 These incidents didn’t 
cause undue tension between the two governments as Britain released the men promptly and 
offered apologies. Both governments were more concerned with their disputes over trade. 
The issue of trade looked set to bring the two countries to war before negotiations resulted in 
the Jay Treaty (1794) which settled issues of commerce but contained no mention of 
impressment. The Jay Treaty has been criticised for this omission. Jay, however, received no 
instructions regarding impressment because the British had not begun the practice on the high 
seas; subsequently the American government felt no need to push the issue given that 
Thomas Pinckney, the American ambassador, was involved in ongoing negotiations in 
London.51 Jay had in fact secured the regulation of impressment in early negotiations. Any 
regulation disappeared when the British realised that America would not enter into an Armed 
Neutrality Pact.52  
 
Impressment was a growing concern for the next decade but only gained heavy attention from 
1803 onwards. In 1803 Britain resumed hostilities with France requiring an increase in 
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manpower. In 1801 Thomas Jefferson had been elected president. Jefferson was a member of 
the Democratic-Republicans who, unlike the Federalists, preferred closer relations with 
France and distrusted British intentions. Towards the end of 1803 James Madison, then 
Secretary of State, thought it would be a suitable time to negotiate with Britain to end 
impressment permanently. Madison sent a letter to James Monroe, the ambassador to 
England, expressing the hope to define contraband as defined in an agreement between Great 
Britain and Russia in 1801. This would define contraband as weapons only. Madison also 
looked to regulate the manner in which merchant ships were searched based on an Anglo-
French Treaty in 1786.53 In this letter Madison also informed Monroe that a bill was before 
Congress entitled A Bill to Further to Protect the Seamen of the United States. The purpose 
of the bill was to punish and restrict any foreign officers that impressed American seamen. 
This would be undertaken by denying	   any comfort to officers who were known to have 
pressed Americans. If the pressing occurred with a U.S port or within a one league of the 
coast the American government had the right to fine the offending officer. The President 
could also impose an order that prohibited any trade or aid with the guilty ship. American 
citizens that were found to be helping the offending party were to be prosecuted.54 This bill 
was rewritten in the Senate and eventually its provisions would be encompassed in sections 
4-6 of An Act for the more effectual preservation of peace in the ports and harbors of the 
United States, and in the waters under their jurisdiction which was ratified in March 1805.55 
This act allowed for ‘for the President of the United States, either to permit or interdict at 
pleasure, the entrance of the harbors and waters under the jurisdiction of the United States to 
all armed, vessels belonging to any foreign nation.’56 The president possessed the power to 
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exercise any punishment stated in the original bill but enforcement did not lie with the courts. 
Instead of prosecution through the legal system any enforcement would lie with the president 
who as leader was obligated to act in the nation’s best interest. Diplomatic pressure could be 
leveraged to restrain punishment leaving offending undeterred from further impressment. The 
deterrence of impressment was heavily subject to the state of diplomatic relations. 
 
Together with diplomatic pressure the deterrence of impressment was often influenced by 
personal views. The aforementioned correspondence was revealed as a personal letter when 
Madison a week later wrote ‘The information and observations which you have as yet 
received from me since your arrival in London, on the impressment of our seamen, and other 
violations of our rights, have been in private letters only.’57 This is a representation of a wider 
problem with American diplomacy surrounding impressment. Personal or unofficial views 
seemed to be the underlying principle of official diplomacy, views which were often 
contradicted by the laws of the United States. Take the example of A Bill to Further to 
Protect the Seamen of the United States. The bill allowed for punishment of British officers 
who impressed within one league of the U.S coast. One league is three nautical miles (‘three 
mile limit’). The three mile limit was accepted at the time by nations to be territorial waters; 
under the jurisdiction of the state. This had been stated as the position of the United States in 
1793 by Thomas Jefferson writing in his capacity as Secretary of State.58 America recognised 
the limits of its territorial governance yet Madison personally believed that a ship carrying its 
flag should be afforded the same rights as U.S territory.59 Madison in his terms as Secretary 
of State and President, however, continued to argue on occasion that ship should be protected 
as an extension of territory. Madison’s arguments had no legal support in his own country let 
alone in Great Britain. While the ideal of sovereignty may have been violated upon the high 
seas no such sovereignty (in the legal sense) as understood by nations at the time existed.     
 
Madison’s principled approach continued to permeate diplomacy. George Clinton, vice 
president under both Jefferson and Madison, concluded that the diplomacy of both presidents 
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was set too ‘much in theory’ and not enough ‘in practical knowledge’.60 Madison (having 
conveyed his personal stance to Monroe in England) now set about America’s official 
position. Madison sent an official proposal concerning possible negotiations with the British 
to Monroe. The letter stated the initial American demands and the expectations which 
America would be satisfied with. Articles III and IV were a reiteration of Madison’s early 
letter in which he explained the correct procedure for boarding a neutral ship and also the 
items which were to be classified as contraband.61 Madison, therefore, had already conceded 
that neutral ships were allowed to be boarded by belligerents at war. Article I in its initial 
form stated that 
 
No person whatever, shall upon the high seas and without the jurisdiction of either party, be demanded 
or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging to citizens or subjects of one of the other parties, by the 
public or private armed ships belonging to or in the service of the other, unless such person be at the 
time in the Military service of an enemy of such other party.62  
 
Madison stated that ‘but it is to be understood that this article shall not exempt any persons 
on board the ships of either of the parties from being taken thereout, by the other party, in 
cases where they may be liable to be so taken according to the laws of nations.’63 Madison 
was playing a dangerous game by allowing men to be taken by the ‘law of nations’. 
International law was only just being articulated during this period. The law of nations fell 
exclusively on the European conception of international law. Madison attempted to cover 
himself by stating that this liability did not extend to men employed of the ship at the time of 
search. Madison’s evoking of law of nations is representative of a wider issue. Madison 
genuinely thought that the law of nations and European countries were sympathetic to the 
American situation. This was false given that other countries practiced impressment, nor did 
European countries come to America’s aid in negotiations. America laboured under this 
illusion until the very last days of the Napoleonic Wars. Madison’s proposal proved to be 
extremely important to future negotiations as it was the basis for the American position right 
up until the outbreak of war. 
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The negotiations over Madison’s proposal did not go smoothly. The proposal was presented 
to Lord Hawkesbury (Foreign Secretary) in early April 1804 but no conference was 
forthcoming. Negotiations were sporadic over the next two years because Monroe was often 
in Madrid.64 Negotiations were set upon in earnest in 1806 with the Monroe-Pinkney mission. 
The Monroe-Pinkney proposal was an almost unaltered version of Madison’s proposal.65 
Early negotiations appeared to fruitful when the Monroe and Pinkney agreed to expand the 
definition of a deserter and consented to a British proposal that a law to be passed by the U.S. 
Congress making it illegal for American captains to hire deserters. The British would also 
pass a similar law and both governments would be obligated to return any deserters to their 
country of origin.66 Zimmermann believed that at this point in time there never had been nor 
would be a better opportunity to solve the issue of impressment.67 However the British 
negotiators suddenly reversed their position under pressure from the Admiralty who 
maintained the practice was an absolute necessity. British ministers also intervened, thinking 
it an unwise political move.68 By the time a treaty was submitted to Madison in January 1807 
the British had given their position. They refused to give up the principles that allowed 
impressment on the high seas but promised to all but end the practice.69 Jefferson declined to 
forward the treaty to the Senate for ratification because it contained no mention of 
impressment and was not in line with ‘national sentiment and legislative policy.’70 Six 
months later on June 22 1807 HMS Leopard halted the USS Chesapeake to search for recent 
deserters from H.M.S Halifax triggering a diplomatic incident known as the Chesapeake-
Leopard Affair. The fallout almost led the two nations to war. Jefferson managed to calm the 
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war cries in America by instituting trade restrictions against British shipping with the 
Embargo Act (1807) and the Non-Intercourse Act (1809). The Monroe-Pinkney negotiations 
and the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair proved to be the last time that impressment was a 
mainstay of American diplomacy. America continued to protest at the practice yet it always 
in the background to the ongoing trade war between America and Britain.71 
 
The American government primarily complained that impressment forced Americans to serve 
in the Royal Navy. The conduct of the Admiralty and its officers no doubt meant that a 
number of natural born American citizens were forced to serve in the Royal Navy. The 
serious point of contention between the two nations was the matter of who exactly was a 
citizen or a subject. America was a nation of immigrants and as seen in Chapter Two this 
caused confusion due to the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance. The process of becoming a 
naturalised American began with the Constitution in which Article I, Section 8 allowed 
Congress ‘To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalisation.’72 On 26 March 1790 Congress 
passed the first naturalisation law that allowed any free white person of ‘good moral 
character’ who had lived in or under the jurisdiction of the U.S for at least two years to 
become a citizen given that he/she had resided within one state for a year. An oath of 
allegiance had to be sworn.73 This Act would be amended in June 1795 requiring a 
declaration to a court that the person intended to become a citizen. This declaration needed to 
occur three years before the application for citizenship. The period of residency was also 
extended to five years.74 The oath was changed where the person not only had to swear an 
oath to uphold the Constitution but also ‘that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and 
abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty 
whatever, and particularly by name, the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whereof he 
was before a citizen or subject.’75 American law clearly stated that to become a citizen any 
previous allegiance must be revoked. Allegiance to a foreign sovereign was null and void due 
to the declaration of the individual. This of course was in direct contradiction to British legal 
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opinion which stated the individual had no right to renounce his allegiance. The naturalisation 
law was amended in 1798. The residency period was increased substantially to fourteen years 
and the intention to apply had to be made five years in advance. The need to abandon 
allegiance to a person’s native country was still required.76 The last amendment to the law 
occurred in April 1802. The new act returned the residency period to five years and the stated 
intention period to three years. Documentation was also addressed with it being decided that 
any immigrant intending to be naturalised should register with the courts so that their age, 
date of birth, country of origin and their intended place of residence could be recored. The 
need to renounce allegiance to a person’s country of origin forever was stressed. The Act 
remained the law on naturalisation until Congress passed the Naturalisation Act of 1870. 
America had a legal process for foreigners to become U.S. citizens from 1790. The final 
definition passed in 1802 a year before impressment began in earnest would appear to make it 
difficult for seamen to become U.S citizens. Sailors who were claimed as U.S. citizens in 
most cases were not naturalised. Sailors could not have resided in America for five years if 
they were plying their trade at sea. Certainty they could not fulfil the requirement of living in 
one state for an entire year.  
 
The naturalisation laws of America fundamentally clashed with the doctrine of indefeasible 
allegiance. Britain maintained that such laws were over riddened by universal law. In 
response Americans attempted to prove the fallacy of indefeasible allegiance. Hay’s A 
Treatise on Expatriation is a reflection of American opinion on impressment, naturalisation 
and expatriation. Hay begins by explaining that the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance is 
nullified by British law and British law does allow for naturalisation. Impressment is based 
on a lie.77 The word ‘expatriation’ had its origins in the Roman period but to Hay it seemed 
that expatriation ‘had its birth in the United States’ due the United States declaring the right 
to happiness and the pursuit of liberty.78 Hay defines expatriation as ‘the removal of an 
individual from a country of which he is a citizen or subject, by which he ceases to be a 
citizens or a subject of that country’79 Hay postulates if a man is to be citizen or ceases to be a 
citizen therefore citizenship must be defined, to this point Hay agrees with the British, that 
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the citizen has both rights and duties. In the event of these right and duties perishing, 
citizenship perished. The connection between the citizen and the state was ended. Evidence 
of this is the American Revolution. The people of the American colonies severed their 
connection with Britain by renouncing their duties.80 Hay notes however that Americans did 
not independently sever this connection. The Treaty of Paris is the point at which the British 
government assented to the renouncement of citizenship. Hay states that if a citizen or subject 
of one nation moves to another he surrenders the right to be a citizen because he cannot 
perform his duties. Hay states that a citizen has five basic duties81 
 
1. Allegiance  
2. Obedience to the laws for the prevention of crimes 
3. to those which require personal service  
4. to those which requirement the payment of taxes on person or property  
5. to those which require a respect for the rights of other citizens 
 
These duties Hay believes are void on immigration because a person is physically removed 
from Britain. A British man who resides in New York cannot be obedient to the law, personal 
service cannot be enforced nor taxes collected.82 The citizen is unable to perform his duties so 
the social contract is void. Based on this argument Hay concludes ‘that expatriation is 
nothing more than emigration with an intention to reside, permanently, in another country.83  
 
Hay expected some challenge to this stance and conceded that the fact of expatriation does 
not automatically allow for the right of expatriation. Hay answered that the laws of England 
allowed for expatriation. Hay contends that the British government had never passed a law 
forbidding emigration despite the widespread dispersal of its citizens over the empire. Hay 
employs the example of Parliament granting the Highland Emigration Society an Act that 
increased the cost of emigrating for the highlands. This act was supposedly meant to limit 
emigration but it meant that Parliament regulated emigration. Parliament indirectly 
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sanctioned emigration.84 Hay goes on assert that the British government are hypocritical in 
maintaining the doctrine indefeasible allegiance because it allows for the complete 
naturalisation of persons who have allegiance to foreign sovereigns. Blackstone claimed the 
principle as a matter of universal law; if a British subject could not become an American 
citizen then no American citizen could become a British subject.85 A British law passed in 
1739 contradicts that assertion. This law (13 Geo II. c3) naturalised foreign seamen who had 
served two years on a British ship or those who had married a British subject.86 This law 
states that all such individuals 
 
to all intents and purposes, be deemed and taken to be natural born subjects of his majesty’s kingdom 
of Great Britain, and have and enjoy all the privileges, powers, rights and capacities which such foreign 
mariner or seamen could, should or ought to have had and enjoyed, in case he had been a natural born 
subject of his majesty and actually a native within the Kingdom of Great Britain. 87  
 
In Hay’s estimation this statue displayed that the British not only allowed for naturalisation 
but saw the allegiance due to naturalisation as no different from native allegiance. The British 
allowed allegiance to be dissolved and could not claim the right to press naturalised 
American citizens.88 Hay’s counter-part in England addressed this issue claiming the 
distinction between the individual and the national character as stated in the previous 
chapter.89  
 
On allegiance Hay maintains that the only distinguishable characteristic between national 
(indefeasible) and local allegiance is the duration of time. Blackstone had written ‘As the 
prince affords his protection to the alien only during his residence in the realm, the allegiance 
of an alien is confined in point of time to the duration of such his residence, and in point of 
locality to the dominions of the British empire.’90 Hay imagined a scenario in which the 
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French invaded England. A Frenchman who had lived in Britain for a number of years 
followed the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance and aided the French army. The Frenchman 
would be condemned as a traitor. The Frenchman could defend himself by claiming he was 
forever under allegiance to his native country. This defence would be dismissed by the 
British court and he would be sentenced to death. Hay asserts his claimed in found in British 
law. According to Foster in a case the judges ruled  ‘that if an alien, seeking the protection of 
the crown, having a family and effects here should during a war with his native country, go 
thither, and there adhere to the king’s enemies for purposes of hostility he may dealt with as a 
traitor’.91 The British within their own laws place local allegiance over national allegiance. In 
addition the British are contradicting their own doctrine by condemning foreigners who 
follow it.  Hay also considered a salient point regarding impressment and citizenship; what 
about non-naturalised aliens? Hay dismisses aliens as irrelevant. British law does not 
distinguish between the two because of the British belief in indefeasible allegiance renders no 
distinction between non-naturalised and naturalised aliens.92 For Hay and America Britain 
allowed for naturalisation and ignored its own doctrine of indefeasible allegiance. This is why 
Britain could claim to rightfully impress naturalised American citizens.    
 
In summary, impressment is an issue of citizenship as well as a matter of diplomacy. The 
right to press native born American citizens was never claimed by the British government. 
The right to claim naturalised Americans was. The U.S.A complained that impressment 
caused American citizens to fight in the Royal Navy. This is correct. The practice of the 
Admiralty and its officers meant that native born American citizens were pressed into British 
service. The real point of contention is naturalised Americans. Anthony Steel said Madison as 
Secretary of State wished to argue the issue as a lawsuit.93 Madison was hampered by 
impressment being a negotiable issue to Jefferson. Madison was trying to legally argue 
against a practice that had stood for centuries from a country whose view on the rights of the 
individual and citizenship were drastically different.  
 
Consistent with American thinking Hay charged the British with wrongly impressing men. 
This charge stems from the American position that men who had left Britain no longer owed 
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allegiance to the King. Hay states if these men intend to settle in America they had the 
protection in the U.S. as citizens. Hay ignores American law. The naturalisation law of 1802 
clearly states five years of residency, one year of residency in one state and that a man must 
declare his intention to become an American citizen three years before his application. British 
seamen who served in the American merchant fleet would have failed to meet these 
requirements if they were at sea; they could not have been a resident of one state nor would 
they have resided within the territorial boundaries of the U.S. for five years. Madison himself 
in his 5 January letter wrote  
 
Should any difficulty be started concerning seamen born within the British dominions, and naturalized 
by the UStates since the Treaty of 1783, you may remove it by observing; first that very few of any 
such naturalizations can take place; the law here requiring a preparatory residence of five years with 
notice of the intention to become a citizen entered of record two years before the last necessary 
formality.94  
 
Madison, by his own admission, stated that an insignificant number of British sailors did 
become U.S. citizens. This is further reinforced by Albert Gallatin’s (then Secretary of the 
Treasury) admission in 1807 that 8,400 sailors on American merchant ships were British even 
by American definition.95 The American government based on its own laws had little right to 
object that a large number of naturalised American citizens were impressed. These ‘citizens’ 
by American law and by the admission of their president were almost nonexistent. 
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The Treaty of Ghent 
 
On 18 June 1812 the U.S. Congress voted for war. Ironically on 16 June the British 
government announced that it would repeal the Orders in Council.96 The repeal largely 
acquiesced to American demands and left impressment as the implied cause of the war. 
Despite declaring war America was more interested in using the declaration of war as 
leverage in foreign policy. Madison believed that the British, who were fighting on two 
continents, would settle quickly.97 Madison’s prediction was proven correct when Sir 
Augustus Foster, the British ambassador, approached Monroe, now Secretary of State, the 
day after the declaration of war. Foster asked for hostilities to be suspended until Britain 
received the declaration, giving time for him to negotiate. Monroe initially refused. A week 
later Monroe relented sending a letter to Jonathan Russell, the U.S. Chargé d'affaires, in 
London stating that if the Orders in Council and impressment were ended along with the 
return of all impressed American seamen there could be peace talks.98 Madison in return 
promised to enact a law forbidding American captains from hiring British sailors. The British 
refused. The Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh noted the ‘[the British government] 
cannot consent to suspend the exercise of a right upon which the naval strength of the empire 
mainly depends.’99 The British refused to yield at all on impressment. 
 
America rejected British peace proposals. They continued to contain no mention of 
impressment. Castlereagh’s letters in early correspondence rejected American counter 
proposals. Castlereagh, however, hinted that negotiations could occur, but not until the law 
forbidding the employment of British sailors in America was enacted.100 Castlereagh wrote 
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I cannot, however, refrain one single point from expressing my surprise, namely that as a condition 
preliminary even to a suspension in hostilities, the Government of the United States should have 
thought fit to demand that the British Government should desist from impressing British seamen from 
the merchant ships of a foreign state, simply on the assurance that a law shall hereafter be passed101 
 
In an attempt to placate the British and bring them back to the negotiating table an act was 
passed in March 1813. Entitled An act for the regulation of seamen aboard the public and 
private vessels of the United States the act made it illegal to hire British seamen.102 Four days 
after the bill was passed the American government received an offer of mediation from Tsar 
of Russia. America’s acceptance of the offer and the passing of the act signalled a major 
breakthrough in peace talks.103 Meanwhile America’s early confidence was beginning to 
wane. America, failing a quick peace, had aimed for a short war in which Britain, fighting in 
Napoleon, would be unable to conduct an effective war in North America. The reduced war 
capacity of Britain, America hoped, would enable the U.S. to make quick territorial gains in 
Canada before forcing the British to negotiate. The American war effort, however, had been 
ineffective to this point. Combined with Napoleon’s disastrous campaign in Russia the 
American government was now anxious to end the war.104 
 
Feeling pressured America still remained ignorant of the reality of the international situation. 
American demands were going to be difficult to meet. Impressment was to be renounced or 
the negotiations were to immediately broken off.105 In April 1813 a return to confidence, 
caused by the capture of York (Toronto), allowed Monroe to write to the delegation advising 
they should now demand to keep territorial acquisitions.106 Madison and Monroe in this bout 
of confidence coupled with Madison’s belief that other European nations held similar views 
on impressment over-estimated international support. They had both assumed that Sweden 
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and Russia, countries with a vested interest in neutral rights, would be supportive.107 Sweden, 
however, was saving all of its diplomatic sway in an attempt annex Norway. Russia had seen 
the negative side of neutral rights when it had allied with Napoleon and wanted to avoid 
alienating Britain.108 The British declined the Russian offer of mediation but arrangements 
were made for direct negotiations. In January 1814 a still confident Monroe sent instructions 
to the American delegation to proceed with negotiations in line with previous instructions.109 
Monroe and Madison remained confident that their demands would be meet, reality indicated 
otherwise. The Napoleonic Wars were drawing to a close. This impacted heavily on 
American negotiations in two ways. Firstly, it meant that the practice of impressment would 
cease given the lack of need for sailors. Secondly, a European peace would allow Britain to 
direct more men and materials against America. Troops of the Sixth Coalition entered Paris 
on 31 March and on 11 April Napoleon abdicated. At this point the American government 
woke up to the fact they had no European allies to help them in negotiations, anti-American 
sentiment was high in Britain and they would soon have to deal with a larger British war 
effort.110 All of this trouble for an issue that would disappear. The sum of these factors forced 
a reversal in American policy. On 25 June Monroe wrote a letter authorising the negotiators 
to remove impressment from the treaty negotiations on the condition that Britain agree to 
separate negotiations regarding impressment.111 On 27 June Monroe completely capitulated 
and instructed that a treaty could be signed which contained no article on impressment.112  
 
The Treaty of Ghent would be signed on Christmas Eve 1814 and took effect on 17 February 
1815. The Treaty contained no mention of impressment. The issue that had once been a 
mainstay in American diplomacy, which had aroused such a swell of patriotism and was the 
official cause of the war, was left unresolved.                 
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Conclusion 
 
The impressment controversy is mythologized in American memory. Impressment was left as 
the foremost reason for the War of 1812. Subsequently impressment has been associated with 
a war that Americans regard as a second war for independence. Impressment though given its 
exalted status had not been a mainstay of American diplomacy since 1807 when the 
commencement of a trade war between America and Europe was of greater concern. 
Furthermore the abandonment of impressment in the Treaty of Ghent shows that America 
was not as committed to ending impressment as their outwardly appeared.  
 
The American government’s complaint against impressment was that American citizens were 
pressed. Inherent in this complaint is that impressment infringed upon national sovereignty.  
There were two types of American citizens involved in the impressment controversy; natural 
born citizens and naturalised citizens. On the former there is no debate; natural born 
American citizens were wrongly impressed by British officers by either design or mistake. 
The latter, naturalised American citizens, are the real conflict about impressment. America 
gave the same rights to these men as natural born citizens. To the British these men did not 
have the right to revoke their citizenship. The British maintained that the doctrine of 
indefeasible allegiance; once a British citizen always a British citizen. British sailors serving 
on American ships were fair game to be pressed. Impressment was the means of regaining 
lost seamen from American ships. The Admiralty in 1812 claimed that 20,000 seamen were 
lost to American ships, given that at the height of the Napoleonic Wars they needed 
approximately 140,000 men to serve the loss of a possible fourteen per cent of its labour pool 
was unacceptable. 
 
The American response to impressment was to negotiate while simultaneously attacking 
Britain’s stance on indefeasible allegiance. The problem was the British government had no 
intention of either abandoning indefeasible allegiance or impressment. The repudiation of 
indefeasible allegiance subsequently would have led to the downfall of impressment, 
inevitably leading to an increased rate of desertion amongst British sailors. During the 
Monroe-Pinkney negotiations when it appeared that impressment could be solved, factions of 
the British administration stepped in to ensure the practice continued. Conversely the 
Americans were willing to drop the issue of impressment if it would allow for a more 
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receptive Britain regarding areas of trade.113 Powers to discourage impressment by punishing 
or refusing aid to British captains ultimately lay with the president, who could be swayed 
from acting if he thought that other matters would be negativity affected. This was 
particularly reflected in impressment moving to the background of diplomacy following the 
Chesapeake-Leopard Affair due to the urgency of the American establishment to settle 
matters of trade. Even when Madison, the staunchest opposition of impressment, ascended to 
the presidency in 1809 impressment still remained a background issue. 
 
This research has explored the basis of impressment and the part the concepts of citizenship 
played in the controversy. Now at the end can anything new be said regarding impressment? 
Zimmermann, whose thesis informed this research to a great degree, believed that America 
had no basis for resisting impressment because it had not stated in law that a naturalised 
citizen must cast aside any previous allegiance until 1848, after the end of impressment.114 
This claim is false. Evidence shows that the U.S. had clearly passed laws in 1795, 1798 and 
1802 that specifically stated a person must renounce allegiance to a foreign sovereign upon 
becoming an American citizen. This begs the question were the Americans justified when 
contesting naturalised sailors could not be impressed? They could and did try but the issue 
was that many of these citizens were not naturalised. American naturalisation laws clearly 
stated that a person must reside in a state for at least a year to qualify for citizenship, for 
sailors plying their trade on the sea this was impossibility. Madison himself admitted that 
only a few hundred sailors had been naturalised by 1814.115 This is not to say that Americans 
did not have other valid complaints about impressment but in the instance of supposed 
naturalised citizens America allowed idealism to led it to argue a position their own laws 
contradicted. 
 
Impressment displayed the differences between the two countries. The issue of naturalisation 
comes down to differing interpretations of natural law. The sovereign’s rights descended for 
divine law (natural law is derived from divine law) through which the British argued that 
impressment was legal and no subject could switch allegiance. America also argued using 
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natural law but from a base of Enlightenment thought in which natural law gave inalienable 
rights to the individual. The individual had the right to decide citizenship for himself. Despite 
Britain maintaining the principles behind impressment it appeared that this stance was mainly 
for practical reasons. Impressment must always be viewed in the context of the Napoleonic 
Wars. Britain was in need of sailors. If Britain gave into American demands then it lost a 
valuable source of manpower. Several times during negotiations Britain agreed to give up 
impressment but only when it would be guaranteed that Americans would refuse to hire 
British sailors. In this scenario Britain maintained the manpower that it needed. Impressment 
only became a serious issue during the Napoleonic Wars and once they were over the British 
maintained the right of impressment but never exercised the right en masse again. For the 
British impressment and indefeasible allegiance were negotiable principles. They were a 
means to an end to ensure the Empire’s survival.     
       
Impressment is a window into the wider tensions between Britain and America during this 
period. Antipathy remained high after the American Revolution. Britain was still reeling from 
the shock that it was defeated by its own upstart colony. The British were afraid that America 
would grow to be an economic challenge and post-revolution restricted America’s ability to 
trade in the West Indies. America resented this action and was infuriated that Britain did not 
show the proper respect especially to its sovereignty. America’s resentment was deepened by 
the reality of the situation. Britain was the owner of a vast empire with a large navy. America 
was an emerging nation. America wanted its national sovereignty to be respected but Britain 
held the upper hand throughout negotiations. America was exhausting itself in an uphill fight. 
The antipathy goes deeper than just losing a war or gaining independence. Britain hated the 
very concept of America. The British treatise early on stated 
 
America is a young nation, and her institutions are still younger; they have been formed on speculative 
notions of the individual independence and inherent rights of man, without much reference to the 
experience of the ancient modes of government.116 
 
 
The British despised the foundation of America- individual rights and freedoms. Life, Liberty 
and pursuit of Happiness. America returned this antipathy. Britain was archaic, corrupt, 
tyrannical and European. This antipathy was why impressment was such a divisive issue. The 
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clash of doctrines and rights involved was the clash of two different ideologies. Two different 
ideologies about government, citizens and subjects.	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